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INtrOdUCtION
Conscious visual perception is inert; it is not instan-
taneous. A conscious visual percept corresponding 
to a specific distal and proximal visual stimulus can 
be altered up to about 100-250 ms after the onset of 
the stimulus. This has been demonstrated by visual 
backward masking studies (cf. Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; 
Stigler, 1910). In visual backward masking, a tempo-
rally trailing visual masking stimulus is presented after 
a visual test stimulus (for reviews see Breitmeyer, 
1984; Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2000). As a consequence 
of the masking stimulus, visibility of the preceding test 
stimulus’ features, such as its brightness, shape, or 
color, can be diminished or even completely prevented 
(Klotz & Neumann, 1999).
From an evolutionary perspective, inertia of con-
scious visual perception, as testified by backward 
masking, is puzzling. Consider the sort of problems 
that visual agents, such as humans, have to solve: 
Successful motor action (e.g., self locomotion, grasp-
ing, pursuit tracking of moving objects by the eye, 
etc.) requires synchronization of motor latencies with 
realities. Therefore, it seems that agents need to in-
stantaneously update the flux of changing visual input 
in consciousness for conscious vision to catch up with 
the real world (cf. Nijhawan, 2002). From this perspec-
tive, the delay of conscious visual perception relative 
to the real world appears to be harmful: It adds to the 
agent’s motor latencies to make them lag behind the 
environmental conditions.
Masked priming
In the course of progress in masking research, how-
ever, the puzzle of inert conscious visual perception 
ABStrACt
According to the sensorimotor supremacy hypoth-
esis, conscious perception draws on motor action. 
In the present report, we will sketch two lines 
of potential development in the field of masking 
research based on the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis. In the first part of the report, evi-
dence is reviewed that masked, invisible stimuli 
can affect motor responses, attention shifts, and 
semantic processes. After the review of the cor-
responding evidence – so-called masked priming 
effects – an approach based on the sensorimotor 
supremacy hypothesis is detailed as to how the 
question of a unitary mechanism of unconscious 
vision can be pursued by masked priming studies. 
In the second part of the report, different models 
and theories of backward masking and masked 
priming are reviewed. types of models based on 
the sensorimotor hypothesis are discussed that 
can take into account ways in which sensorimo-
tor processes (reflected in masked priming ef-
fects) can affect conscious vision under backward 
masking conditions.
Advances in Cognitive Psychology
DOI: 10.2478/v10053-008-0029-9
258
http://www.ac-psych.org
Ulrich Ansorge, Odmar Neumann, Stefanie I. Becker, Holger Kälberer, and Holk Cruse
dissolved. Visibility and visual processing in the ser-
vice of motor action (in the following referred to as 
visual sensorimotor processes) turned out to be differ-
ent matters (Fehrer & Raab, 1962; Klotz & Neumann, 
1999): Exactly those visual faculties that would suffer 
most from inert conscious perception – that is, visual 
sensorimotor processes, are spared under invisibility 
conditions (Bridgeman, 1992; Bridgeman, Lewis, Heit, 
& Nagle, 1979; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Neumann 
& Klotz, 1994). Fehrer and Raab (1962), for exam-
ple, had their participants react to backward-masked 
visual stimuli, and found that responses to the subjec-
tively invisible stimuli were as efficient as responses to 
clearly visible stimuli.
Yet, Fehrer and Raab required a single, uniform reac-
tion to each and every stimulus. Thus, their conclusion 
was doubtful for it was unclear whether participants 
indeed reacted to the invisible stimuli, as Fehrer and 
Raab thought, or whether participants were reacting 
to the mask, with the masked stimulus pre-warning 
for the upcoming mask and, thus, reducing the time 
necessary to (a) perceive the mask and (b) respond to 
it (Neumann, 1982).
It was not before the advent of the masked priming 
paradigm that it was demonstrated that participants 
can respond to an invisible stimulus shown below the 
threshold of conscious awareness (Marcel, 1983; Wolff, 
1989). In the masked priming paradigm, the backward-
masked test stimulus is not the main target of action 
(in contrast to investigations such as that of Fehrer & 
Raab). Instead, the test stimulus is an accessory stimu-
lus that precedes the clearly visible target. The test 
stimulus is called “a prime” because of its facilitating (or 
interfering) effect on the response to the clearly visible 
target (Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Wolff, 1989).
For an example of the masked priming procedure, 
take a look at Figure 1, where stimuli and trial details of 
the study of Klotz and Neumann (1999) are depicted. 
In each trial of their study, Klotz and Neumann showed 
their participants a pair of clearly visible geometric fig-
ures, a square and a diamond, with one of the figures 
presented left and the other one right of fixation. These 
geometric figures served two purposes. First, one of 
the figures was the target for the responses of the par-
ticipants (the other figure was a distractor): Half of the 
participants responded to the position of the square as 
a target, with a left-hand key press if the square was 
left and a right-hand key press if the square was right. 
(These participants had to ignore the diamonds as dis-
tractors.) The other half of the participants responded 
in a corresponding manner to the position of the dia-
monds (and had to ignore the squares as distractors).
The clearly visible geometric figures also served, 
secondly, as backward masks that prevented the vis-
ibility of a pair of preceding primes, one presented at 
the same position as the target and one at the position 
of the distractor. To mask the primes, the visible square 
and diamond were slightly larger than the primes such 
that their inner contours exactly fitted around the 
outer contours of the smaller primes. Thereby, ideal 
conditions for metacontrast masking of the primes by 
the larger target and distractor figures were created 
(cf. Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006).
As it can be seen in Figure 1, primes were also geo-
metric figures, smaller than the target and the distractor 
but otherwise very similar to them. The crucial variation 
concerned whether or not the prime indicated the same 
response as the target. In congruent conditions, the pair 
of masked primes had a target-like prime shape at the 
position of the upcoming target shape. For example, a 
square-shaped prime on the left preceded a square-
shaped target on the left. Hence, if it were true that an 
invisible (backward-masked) prime can activate a re-
sponse, facilitation of the response to the target was to be 
expected because prime and target indicated the same 
response (i.e., a left-hand key press in the example). In 
incongruent conditions, the pair of masked primes had a 
target-like prime shape at the position opposite to that 
of the upcoming target shape. For example, a square-
shaped prime on the left preceded a square-shaped tar-
get on the right. If it were true that this invisible prime 
can activate a response, interference with the response 
to the target was to be expected because prime and tar-
get indicated alternative, mutually exclusive responses 
(i.e., in the example the prime indicated a right-hand 
Figure 1. 
Depicted is a congruent trial, with a masked target-shaped 
prime (e.g., a square) on the same side as the visible tar-
get shape; procedure after Klotz and Neumann (1999). Ar-
rows stand for motion of the fixation dots (toward the screen 
center). For details refer to the text.
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key press, whereas the target required a left-hand key 
press). Facilitation in congruent conditions and interfer-
ence in incongruent conditions were expected to show 
up in comparison to a neutral baseline condition without 
a target-like shape prime. For example, if squares were 
used as targets, the pair of masked stimuli in the neutral 
condition consisted of two diamonds.
Results of studies by Neumann and Klotz (1994), 
and Klotz and Neumann (1999) nicely supported these 
expectations. RTs (Reaction Times) under congruent 
conditions were shorter than under neutral conditions, 
and RTs under incongruent conditions were longer than 
under neutral conditions. (A corresponding trend was 
observed in the error rates.) Importantly, RT effects 
accomplished with the masked priming paradigm can-
not be attributed to the facilitation of mask perception 
by the pre-warning primes because such a pre-warning 
would have led to equal facilitation under congruent, 
neutral, and incongruent conditions.
In essence, the masked-priming procedure directly 
pits the effect of the invisible prime against that of the 
visible target: The prime indicates one specific response 
and the target signifies a second, frequently alternative 
response (Marcel, 1983; Wolff, 1989). There are now 
numerous studies that have confirmed that under these 
conditions, an invisible prime activates a motor response 
that can delay the response required for the visible tar-
get or that occurs instead of the response to the target 
(cf. Ansorge, 2003; Ansorge, Klotz, & Neumann, 1998; 
Breitmeyer, Ro, & Singhal, 2004; Eimer, 1999; Klotz & 
Neumann, 1999; Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Leuthold & Kopp, 
1998; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Schmidt, 2001, 2002; 
Schmidt, Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006; Vorberg, Mattler, 
Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003; for a review 
see also Schmidt, this volume).
In addition, although results from the masked prim-
ing paradigm are maybe the most unequivocal evi-
dence in favor of spared visual sensorimotor process-
ing capacities under invisibility conditions, they are by 
far not the only evidence. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, 
& Carey (1991), for instance, observed that for an ag-
nostic patient (DF), her object agnosia rendered visual 
size and orientation information invisible and yet the 
patient was able to use the very same visual infor-
mation successfully in the sensorimotor domain, for 
purposes such as grasping and wrist rotation.
the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis
According to the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, 
dissociability between visual sensorimotor processing 
and conscious visual perception is due to different func-
tions and onsets of the respective processing mecha-
nisms during the course of phylogenetic evolution and 
ontogenetic development. To start with, sensorimotor 
visual processing is an achievement meeting a press-
ing and pertinent problem in human evolution and 
ontogenetic development because visual sensorimotor 
processing is necessary for successful coordination of 
behavior within the visual environment: Numerous 
life-maintaining behaviors, such as feeding, procrea-
tion, etc., draw on the human’s capacity to use visual 
information to anticipate and to control its grasping 
movements, gait, eye movements, and so on. 
By contrast, conscious visual perception does not 
solve a similarly pressing problem in the course of 
evolution or ontogenetic development. Conscious 
visual processing more likely serves purposes such 
as maintaining a visual image beyond its physical 
duration (cf. Hardcastle, 1995; Neisser, 1967), thus 
making it available for more diverse purposes after its 
initial representation (cf. Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). 
Therefore, according to the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis, visual sensorimotor processing is the more 
fundamental and ancient adaptation in comparison to 
conscious vision.
In line with this assumption of the sensorimotor 
supremacy hypothesis, conscious visual perception 
as the more recent evolutionary achievement seem-
ingly builds on the more ancient visual sensorimotor 
processing capacities (cf. Helmholtz, 1879; O’Regan & 
Noë, 2001). Slightly moving the eyes, for instance, is a 
necessary prerequisite for conscious visual perception: 
Stabilization of the retinal image by moving the image 
in accord with the eyes is known to rapidly lead to a 
fading of the conscious visual percept (Riggs, Ratliff, 
Cornsweet, & Cornsweet, 1953). In general, according 
to the views that are summarized as the sensorimotor 
supremacy hypothesis, visual sensory input in a first 
step provides a prediction that is secondly validated 
by comparing it with predicted premotor or motor 
consequences, with thirdly conscious visual perception 
corresponding to only the confirmed predictions. On a 
phenomenal level, the standard everyday experience 
accompanying this processing cycle is that of visual 
gist perception (cf. Neisser, 1967) being transformed 
into a conscious visual percept segregated into center 
and fringe (cf. James, 1890). On the motor and pre-
motor level, eye movements, such as saccades (e.g., 
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Wolff, 2004), and visuospatial attention shifts preced-
ing the saccades (or even occurring instead of them) 
(cf. Neisser, 1967; Simons & Rensink, 2005; Treisman 
& Gelade, 1980) are most frequently used for the 
purpose of conscious visual perception. Detection of 
change across images, for example, depends on a 
prior shifting of visuospatial attention to that position 
in the image plane at which the change occurs (Simons 
& Rensink, 2005). Therefore, conscious visual percep-
tion comes at the price of a delayed latency, with a 
less than perfect temporal resolution, because the cor-
relations which give rise to conscious visual perception 
can only be derived after the sensory inputs and their 
temporally trailing motor or premotor consequences. 
Yet, as will be discussed in the next passage, this pro-
posed role of sensorimotor processing for conscious 
visual perception seems to be in conflict with a long-
standing notion that we will refer to as the inflexibility 
assumption.
Processing unconscious visual 
input: flexible or inflexible?
According to the inflexibility assumption, visual fac-
ulties that are independent of consciously perceived 
input are inflexible, strongly automatic, or hard-wired 
(cf. McCormick, 1997; Posner & Snyder, 1975). This 
means that unconscious input presented below the 
threshold of awareness can only be processed in a 
fixed manner: The corresponding processes are inflex-
ible or not malleable. 
If the inflexibility assumption were true, the sen-
sorimotor supremacy hypothesis, as outlined above, 
would seem to be faced with a paradox. On the one 
hand, the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis claims 
that visual sensorimotor processes have to precede 
conscious visual perception to fulfill their validating 
function for conscious perception: Premotor or motor 
consequences need to be correlated with their preced-
ing sensory inputs before conscious visual perception 
of these inputs. On the other hand, the inflexibility 
of the processing of a particular unconscious visual 
input stimulus seems to severely limit (a) the range 
of possible motor effects that can be used as a cor-
relating consequence of that input, and thus also (b) 
the range of possible correlations between input and 
output.
With respect to these concerns, however, it should 
be noted that two sorts of inflexibility have to be dis-
cerned that create the seeming paradox only if they 
are confused with one another. First, inflexibility or 
non-malleability of input-output relations means that 
each and every particular visual input can only lead 
to a limited class of particular motor outputs as valid 
transformations of the input, once a particular action 
is intended. Let’s say that we intend to point in the 
direction of a light, positioned 45° to the left of our 
straight-ahead viewing direction. Under these condi-
tions, a valid transformation of the input would be a 
pointing direction that is at least approximately in the 
direction 45° to the left, and certainly pointing 45° to 
the right would be a violation of the intended motor 
output.
This sort of input-output inflexibility is undisputed. 
In fact, it is necessary for the functional role of senso-
rimotor processing in validating conscious visual per-
ception. If one and the same visual input could have 
any of several motor effects as its valid output, the 
motor output could not be predicted, and correlating 
input and output would not be used to confirm the 
content of conscious visual perception. Thus, accord-
ing to the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, once a 
particular motor output has been intended, input-out-
put transformations should indeed proceed in a fixed 
manner.
However, this sort of input-output relation inflex-
ibility must be carefully discerned from a second sort 
of inflexibility: output selection inflexibility. Output 
selection inflexibility means that the unconscious 
stimulus input determines which motor actions can be 
performed. Thus, output selection inflexibility means 
that an agent cannot intentionally decide in advance 
of the stimuli about the way that she or he wants to 
use the visual input for her or his motor action. This 
second sort of inflexibility is sometimes considered as 
being characteristic of processing unconscious visual 
stimuli (cf. McCormick, 1997). From the standpoint 
of the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, however, 
output selection inflexibility is clearly denied. Even 
more important, output selection inflexibility is not 
supported by the empirical facts.
According to the best known theory defending this 
particular assumption of the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis, the so-called direct parameter specifica-
tion (DPS) account (Neumann, 1989, 1990; for related 
conceptions see Kiefer, this volume; Kiesel, Kunde, & 
Hoffmann, this volume), it is possible to intentionally 
choose, in advance of an unconscious visual input, 
among several different motor effectors (e.g., eyes vs. 
hands) and among several different motor parameters 
(e.g., direction vs. distance of to-be-grasped objects) 
as potential motor variables to be specified by uncon-
scious visual input. To stay with our example, with an 
input consisting of a visual light positioned 45° to the 
Sensorimotor supremacy
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left, DPS predicts that we can also successfully intend 
to point in a direction 90° shifted to the right of the 
visual input light. Once we have prepared such an ac-
tion plan in advance of the input, an unconscious light 
positioned 45° to the left should lead to a pointing 
response 45° to the right of the straight-ahead view-
ing direction as its predicted and valid motor conse-
quence. (Note that input-output inflexibility would still 
be necessary to tell valid from invalid responses.)
In line with this assumption of intentional flexibi-
lity in choosing among different motor outputs, visual 
agents are able to flexibly tailor the consciousness-
dissociated visual sensorimotor processing to their 
currently intended actions (Ansorge, 2004; Ansorge, 
Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 
2001, 2005; Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, 
& Hoffmann, 2003; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Neumann 
& Klotz, 1994; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). Neumann and Klotz 
(1994), for instance, found that participants were able 
to intend different actions as instructed under different 
conditions and thus were able to use one and the same 
unconscious visual stimulus input equally well for the 
purpose of different motor responses. Specifically, 
participants were able to either respond in the direc-
tion of an unconscious visual input stimulus (e.g., they 
activated a left-hand key-press in response to a left 
unconscious stimulus) or in the direction opposite to 
that input (e.g., they activated a right-hand key-press 
in response to a left unconscious stimulus).
Summary
To summarize, the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis 
assumes that visual sensorimotor processing temporal-
ly precedes conscious visual perception. Phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic progression is from the more basic 
building blocks of visual sensorimotor processing 
– meeting the most pressing demands – to the more 
advanced levels of conscious vision. Conscious visual 
perception, by contrast, is based on a comparison 
of intended motor outcomes with what has actually 
been done (Cruse, 2003; Helmholtz, 1879; Hoffmann, 
1993). In line with that assumption, visual sensori-
motor processing is dissociable from visual conscious 
perception (cf. Klotz & Neumann, 1999).
Open questions
Despite the above summarized progress in our under-
standing of the interplay between conscious and un-
conscious visual processes, several obstacles remain 
for a unified theory of masked priming or unconscious 
vision. In the following, we identify two of them and 
propose ways how the principle of sensorimotor su-
premacy could be used to understand and empirically 
approach the outstanding questions.
First, we will review evidence from visual back-
ward-masking studies concerned with the shifting of 
visuospatial attention toward masked invisible stimuli 
and with the semantic processing of masked invis-
ible stimuli. Obviously, faculties of unconscious vision 
reflected in masked motor priming could be different 
from those responsible for masked attentional priming 
and masked semantic priming effects. However, one 
part of the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis we in-
tend to put forward is that all of the different masked 
priming effects could be explained by a unified princi-
ple of consciousness-dissociated visual sensorimotor 
processing. We will end this first passage with a sketch 
of empirical means suited to test a unified account of 
masked priming effects based on the principle of sen-
sorimotor supremacy.
In the second part, we will briefly review current 
theories that account for backward masking. From this 
review, we conclude that masking theories have so 
far not fully incorporated the potential implications of 
findings from masked priming studies. In particular, 
with few exceptions, existing masking theories treat 
sensorimotor priming as inconsequential for what is 
consciously seen under masking conditions. By con-
trast, we will outline a type of sensorimotor supremacy 
model that regards priming effects as being causally 
responsible for what is perceived under masking condi-
tions. The model draws on the established attentional 
effect that a masked prime exerts on the conscious 
visual perception of the mask (cf. Neumann, 1982), 
and extends the explanation to the sensorimotor level. 
We will conclude the second review with a brief outline 
of new testable predictions derived from a sensorimo-
tor supremacy model of visual masking.
teStINg A UNIFIed ACCOUNt OF 
MASKed PrIMINg eFFeCtS
Masked priming: motor, 
attentional, and semantic
A visually (backward) masked, and thus invisible, 
prime can have at least three different effects. In terms 
of the procedures that have been used, these effects 
are definitely different from one another. However, 
whether or to what extent there also exist similarities 
between the effects, and whether it is necessary to 
give different accounts for these effects, is debatable 
under the perspective of the sensorimotor supremacy 
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hypothesis. This will be detailed in the following para-
graphs.
First, it is relatively certain that under appropriate 
conditions, an invisible prime can activate a motor 
response. Neumann and Klotz (1994), for example, 
used a pair of black bars as a clearly visible target, 
and asked their participants to respond to that target’s 
position. With a target on the right, observers had to 
press a right-hand key, and with a target on the left, 
they had to press a left-hand key. Prior to the target, a 
pair of masked smaller black bars was presented as a 
prime. Under these conditions, the prime facilitated the 
response if it was presented at the target’s position, 
and it interfered with the response if it was presented 
at a position away from the target. Interference and 
facilitation were evident in comparison to a neutral 
baseline condition without a masked prime (see also 
Klotz & Neumann, 1999, and above).
Several lines of evidence corroborated the con-
clusion that this priming effect reflected sensorimo-
tor processes. Leuthold and Kopp (1998) used the 
procedure of Neumann and Klotz, and showed that 
prime-induced interference was also reflected in the 
direction of the lateralized readiness potential of the 
EEG, a known correlate of pre-motor and motor ac-
tivation, mostly originating in the primary motor cor-
tex (Leuthold & Jentzsch, 2002). Similar results were 
found by using slightly different procedures (Dehaene 
et al., 1998; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
Another approach was made by Neumann and Klotz 
(1994), and Ansorge and Neumann (2005). These au-
thors noted that the two factors of (a) similarity/dis-
similarity of responses activated by prime and target, 
respectively, and of (b) sensory similarity/dissimilarity 
between prime and target, were confounded in masked 
priming studies. Therefore, they wanted to rule out 
that masked priming effects were merely due to sen-
sory processes, that is, to the lower sensory similar-
ity between prime and target in interfering relative to 
facilitating conditions. To that end, they used the same 
sensory conditions in both sensorimotor interfering 
and sensorimotor facilitating conditions: The masked 
prime was always presented with the same distance 
and at the same position away from the target, but 
the prime required the same response as the spatially 
distant target in some conditions, whereas it required 
a response other than the target in alternative condi-
tions. Again, in line with a sensorimotor interpreta-
tion (i.e., a response activation effect), and disproving 
an account merely in terms of sensory prime-target 
similarity, interference by the prime was observed if 
the prime indicated a response other than the target 
relative to a condition where the prime signified the 
same response as the target.
Still another line of evidence was provided by 
Vorberg et al. (2003). These authors asked their par-
ticipants to respond in the direction of a visible target, 
either a left or a right pointing arrow. As a prime, they 
used a backward-masked target-preceding (smaller) 
arrow. The prime either pointed in the same direction 
as the target or in the opposite direction. The prime-
target interval varied from a single refresh of the com-
puter screen to about 100 ms. The most important 
observation of Vorberg et al. (2003) was that, with 
an interfering invisible prime, error probability was a 
function of the prime-target interval. The probability of 
an erroneous response in the direction of an interfer-
ing prime arrow (pointing in the opposite direction to 
the target) increased with the time by which the prime 
arrow was presented before the visible target arrow. 
This finding is in line with a motor activation effect: 
The prime is able to activate a response corresponding 
to its direction. This motor activation eventually leads 
to an overt response if it is not sufficiently quickly 
countermanded by a competing response activated by 
the visible target.
A second kind of masked priming effect is of an 
attentional origin. According to a widely held notion, 
the abrupt onset of a visual stimulus in the periph-
ery of the visual field captures attention automatically 
(cf. Jonides, 1981; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), at least 
if the features of the visual stimulus are sufficiently 
task-relevant (cf. Ansorge & Heumann, 2003, 2004; 
Folk & Remington, 1998, 1999; Folk, Remington, & 
Johnston, 1992). Along these lines, Neumann (1982; 
see also Neumann & Scharlau, in press) argued that 
a backward-masked, invisible prime presented prior 
to a visible mask and at the mask’s position should 
facilitate the visual perception of the mask, under the 
following two assumptions: (a) visual conscious per-
ception of a stimulus depends on a prior shifting of 
attention to (or focusing of attention on) the position 
of the perceived stimulus (cf. Neisser, 1967; Simons 
& Rensink, 2005), and (b) an invisible stimulus (such 
as a backward-masked prime) is capable of capturing 
visuospatial attention (cf. McCormick, 1997). If both 
assumptions hold true, an invisible prime preceding a 
visible mask at its position should attract attention. As 
a consequence, attention would be already at the posi-
tion of the mask when the mask has its onset. Thus, 
the prime should shorten the delay until the mask can 
be consciously perceived (cf. Neumann, 1982).
A very similar prediction can be made on the basis 
of the perceptual retouch theory (Bachmann, 1984, 
Sensorimotor supremacy
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1994). According to the perceptual retouch theory, 
conscious perception of a visual stimulus requires 
two steps, (a) an initial onset response evoked in the 
visual cortex, and (b) a second signal that confirms 
this initial cortex response, with the confirmation sig-
nal being delayed by about 80 ms relative to the initial 
brain response. According to the perceptual retouch 
theory, the masked prime evokes its corresponding in-
itial brain response, but once the delayed confirmatory 
signal reaches the visual cortex, mask-induced activity 
prevails at the location formerly occupied by the prime 
and is confirmed instead of the already passed prime-
induced activity. Thus, according to the perceptual 
retouch theory too, a backward-masked prime should 
shorten the time to consciously perceive a visual mask 
(but see Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 2006, for 
differences between the predictions of perceptual re-
touch theory and an explanation by visuospatial at-
tention).
In several investigations, Scharlau and her col-
leagues bore out the attentional hypothesis (e.g., 
Scharlau, 2002, this volume; Scharlau & Neumann, 
2003a, 2003b). Scharlau’s general procedure requires 
participants to give a temporal order judgment (TOJ) 
about which of two visible stimuli comes first, with the 
interval between these two stimuli varying from con-
comitant onsets to some tens of milliseconds between 
their respective onsets. If a masked prime is presented 
as a third stimulus in advance and at the position of 
only one of the other two stimuli, the primed stimulus 
of the two latter stimuli seems to temporally lead the 
unprimed stimulus even under conditions where both 
primed and unprimed stimulus have had a concomi-
tant onset.
Further support for an attentional effect of the 
masked prime was provided by Jaśkowski and col-
leagues (Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Veleger, 2003). These 
authors used a negative event-related potential at 
stimulus-contralateral, posterior scalp sites to track 
where participants directed their visuospatial atten-
tion, and were able to demonstrate that attention was 
directed toward a backward-masked invisible prime 
(see also Ansorge & Heumann, 2006). Very similar 
results have been obtained with stimuli that were 
backward-masked by four dots (cf. Woodman & Luck, 
2003). So much for an attentional effect of an uncon-
scious, masked prime.
Still, in a third variant, priming is by masked words. 
This has been sometimes attributed to processing with-
in semantic memory (cf. Dehaene et al., 1998; Kiefer & 
Spitzer, 2000; Marcel, 1983). In the so-called masked 
semantic priming studies, words are used as masked 
primes and/or visible targets. A masked priming word 
which is semantically associated with an upcoming 
visible target word facilitates the response to the vis-
ible target word relative to a masked priming word 
which is not or less semantically associated with the 
visible target word (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1985; 
Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996). It is commonly 
assumed that semantic priming by masked priming 
words reflects spreading mutual activation of repre-
sentations of priming word and target word within an 
interconnected memory network. In semantic memory 
(or mental lexicon if one wishes to restrict the account 
to visual words), connections between related repre-
sentations are stronger (or put another way: more fa-
cilitative) than connections between less or unrelated 
representations (which are also sometimes assumed 
to be inhibitory) (cf. McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; 
Morton, 1969; Neely, 1991). As a consequence of this 
general architecture, the semantic representation of 
a masked prime can pre-activate the representation 
of a semantically related visual target word presented 
after the prime, so that a critical threshold activation 
value of the target-word representation that allows 
the recognition or discrimination of the target word is 
rapidly achieved.
Admittedly, many masked priming effects that 
were attributed to spreading activation within seman-
tic memory can be explained equally well by sensori-
motor processes. Marcel (1983), for example, asked 
his participants to name the color of a clearly visible 
target patch. Hence, a masked color word prime that 
denoted the color of the upcoming patch (e.g., the 
masked word “red” preceding a clearly visible, to 
be named red color patch) might have activated the 
correct naming response, whereas a masked color 
word prime that denoted a color different from that 
of the upcoming target patch (e.g., the masked word 
“green” preceding a clearly visible, to be named red 
color patch) could have interfered with the correct 
naming response.
However, in line with the spreading-activation ac-
count, a masked word priming effect is also observed 
where a response activation effect can be ruled out. 
Kiefer (2002), for instance, used a lexical decision 
task: In each trial, a word or a nonword was presented 
as a visible target, and participants had to decide 
whether the target was or was not a word. Therefore, 
the priming word always indicated the same response 
(i.e., a ‘word’ response). Yet event-related potentials 
were affected by the amount of semantic association 
that existed between the masked priming word and 
visible target word: Less semantically target-associ-
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ated masked priming words induced a stronger N400 
– a component reflecting semantic language processes 
(cf. Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) – than more target-associ-
ated masked priming words.
Different time courses of priming effects with (a) 
masked words vs. (b) masked-shape/location stimuli 
lent additional indirect support for the distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, semantic priming and on the 
other hand, sensorimotor priming as reflecting dis-
tinctive processes. Research with masked location or 
shape primes showed that sensorimotor effects of the 
masked prime reverse with a prime-target interval be-
yond about 100 ms (cf. Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Jaśkowski & Verleger, this volume; Schlaghecken, 
Rowley, Sembi, Simons, & Whitcomb, this volume; 
Sumner, this volume), at least if the masked prime 
is both task-relevant and similar to one of the vis-
ible targets (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2001; 
Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Lleras & Enns, 2004, 2005, 
2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002, 2004; Verleger, 
Jaśkowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). 
By contrast, the priming effect of masked word primes 
typically does not invert with an increasing prime-tar-
get interval. It follows a different time course, being 
present with relatively short prime-target intervals (< 
100 ms) but absent with longer prime-target intervals 
(Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). This latter finding fits well 
with the assumption that masked semantic priming is 
due to spreading activation within semantic (lexical) 
memory, giving way over time to slower, more deliber-
ate processing (cf. Neely, 1977).
A unitary account of masked 
priming effects?
From the review above, it should be clear that in a triv-
ial sense, masked priming effects rely at least to some 
extent on different specific stimulus properties. Think 
of the participants discriminating between leftward 
and rightward pointing masked arrows (Vorberg et al., 
2003). If such discrimination were not possible with 
masked arrows, different masked arrows should have 
had the same effect, which is not the case. Likewise, 
if participants were unable to discriminate between 
different electromagnetic frequencies or wavelengths 
(i.e., “colors”) of masked visual stimuli (cf. Breitmeyer 
et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2006), 
masked priming effects of red and black stimuli should 
have been the same, irrespective of whether searched-
for visible targets were black or red, again a prediction 
which is at variance with observations (Ansorge & 
Neumann, 2005).
As a plausible starting point, we therefore concede 
that processing of masked visual stimuli might rely on 
different underlying mechanisms in the extent that 
the masked stimuli have different discriminated visual 
features (different colors, shapes, locations). Yet this 
does not preclude the possibility that different under-
lying processes of unconscious vision or masked prim-
ing also share important characteristics. In fact, the 
latter assumption is likely in light of the high similarity 
between different masked-priming procedures.
In the following, we will take a two-step approach to 
devise a test for the hypothesis of a unitary mechanism 
reflected in different masked priming effects. First, we 
outline which kind of commonality exists between dif-
ferent faculties of unconscious vision, starting with a 
discussion of sensorimotor and attentional processes, 
and proceeding to a theory involving also semantic 
processes. We will then in a second step sketch the 
general empirical approach that can be used to inves-
tigate whether these theoretically conceivable commo-
nalities indeed exist.
Starting at the theoretical level, from the per-
spective of the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, 
all unconscious vision is of the form of sensorimotor 
processing. If this holds true, how can we account for 
masked attentional priming? 
This task is easily accomplished because selectiv-
ity reflected in visuospatial attention basically serves 
sensorimotor control as assumed above and as we will 
explain in a minute. To start with, from the viewpoint 
of the agent, the amount of effector systems that are 
available to perform in a given task or situation is al-
ways restricted. For instance, humans have only two 
hands to grasp. The range of possible actions is even 
further restricted to those which can be made from 
the actually held effector positions in space. This lim-
ited space of possible motor actions imposes the need 
for selectivity reflected in phenomena of visuospatial 
attention (e.g., Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987), the 
most pertinent example of this generalization being 
that visuospatial attention is used in the control of eye 
movements (e.g., saccades). To successfully program 
the direction and the amplitude of a saccade toward a 
visual target, a viewer has to select and incorporate 
sensory information about the target’s location rela-
tive to the currently fixated position. According to the 
premotor theory of attention, this function is served 
by visuospatial attention (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, 
& Umiltà, 1987; Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994). 
In line with the premotor theory, an overt saccade (as 
well as a pointing movement toward a visual target) 
is preceded by a shift of visuospatial attention toward 
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that target’s location (Deubel & Schneider, 1996, 
2004). 
In conclusion, from a theoretical perspective alone 
it is likely that commonalities exist between uncon-
scious visual sensorimotor processes and unconscious 
shifting of visuospatial attention. The common de-
nominator is the need to select among different sen-
sory information for the purpose of action. In other 
words, shifting of visuospatial attention is but a very 
frequently used mechanism of steering motor actions, 
such as saccades.
But how does semantic processing fit into the pic-
ture? According to one widely held notion, which is 
rooted in the initial research agenda of cognitive sci-
ence, semantic information is represented in a rela-
tively abstract or amodal manner (Newell & Simon, 
1972; Pylyshyn, 1984). This means that we can disre-
gard the hardware-dependent sensorimotor-process-
ing level of the representing system for the analysis 
of its computational mnemonic functions. It is this 
basic contention that made it possible to simulate and 
study human memory by analogy to the computer. In 
the extent that semantic processes occur independ-
ently of sensorimotor processes, unconscious sensori-
motor processes cannot account for masked semantic 
priming.
However, views on semantic representations in gen-
eral have changed since then. The embodied cognition 
view assumes that we cannot abstain from taking 
into account what goes on at the more basic sensory 
and sensorimotor level of processing if we seek to 
explain and to understand semantic memory proc-
esses (Barsalou, 1999; Wilson, 2002). According to 
Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems theory, 
for example, sensory and sensorimotor representa-
tions are stored as part of an original experience, and 
a semantic memory representation is instantiated as 
drawing on the representative and characteristic as-
pects of several of the more basic sensory and senso-
rimotor memory representations. From this theoretical 
perspective, semantic meaning and sensory/percep-
tual features are processed and stored by shared 
mechanisms, allowing for relatively similar effects and 
direct interactions between semantic and sensory or 
sensorimotor processes.
In line with the embodied cognition view, Proctor 
and Vu (2002), for example, found evidence for both 
predictions. Participants had to respond to the color 
of the words ‘left’ and ‘right’: Participants that had to 
press a left key in response to a green word, also had 
to press a right key to a red word. Spatial semantic 
meaning of the target word (i.e., its respective spatial 
connotation) was task-irrelevant. Under these condi-
tions, spatial meaning of the target word nonetheless 
significantly affected response efficiency. A target word 
with a spatial meaning corresponding to the direction 
of the required response (e.g., the red word “right” re-
quiring a right-key press) led to faster responses than 
a target word with a spatial meaning not correspond-
ing to the direction of the response (e.g., the green 
word “right” requiring a left-key press).
Such results indicate that semantic representations 
can directly impact on sensorimotor processes, as 
would be predicted by the embodied cognition view: 
This impact is reflected in the efficiency of response 
execution. Moreover, similar spatial correspondence 
effects are observed with non-word stimuli, which have 
no spatial semantic meaning but which are presented 
either at a corresponding observer-relative location (a 
red stimulus on the right requiring a right key press) 
or at a non-corresponding position (a green stimulus 
on the right requiring a left key press; for a review 
of the effect, see Lu & Proctor, 1995). To conclude, 
results such as Proctor and Vu’s (2002) indicate that 
semantic processes and sensory or sensorimotor proc-
esses can directly interact with one another and can 
have comparable effects.
Proctor and Vu’s (2002) study is also a nice example 
of how the research in this area should be pursued. To 
test the unitary sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis 
of masked semantic, attentional, and sensorimotor 
priming we should look for (a) similarities between the 
respective masked priming effects in motor priming 
and semantic priming studies and (b) direct interac-
tions between different levels of processing, such as 
masked semantic and masked sensorimotor priming 
effects, as these are reflected in task performance. 
Concerning the attentional effect of the masked prime, 
for instance, we propose to take one of the character-
istics of the masked priming sensorimotor effect and 
to test whether it can be replicated in the attentional 
domain.
As an example of that kind of research, Ansorge 
(2003) compared temporal-nasal visual hemifield 
asymmetries of the strength of the masked priming 
effect under two conditions. In one condition, only 
response activation could have contributed to the 
masked priming effect. In another condition, visuospa-
tial attention contributed to the masked priming effect 
too. Results showed that this difference between the 
conditions did not matter. In line with the hypothesis 
of a common origin of different masked priming ef-
fects, temporally presented masked primes always 
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led to stronger priming effects than nasally presented 
masked primes.
However, the evidence is not always in favor of a 
common unitary account of masked priming effects. 
Ansorge and Heumann (2006), for example, tried to 
replicate the well-established top-down contingency 
of the response-activation effect of masked primes 
(cf. Ansorge & Neumann, 2001; Kunde et al., 2003) 
for the attentional effect of masked primes. Using an 
ERP-measure of visuospatial attention, this replication 
failed. Yet, the results were preliminary, because in 
Ansorge and Heumann’s 2006 study, ERP-measures 
indicative of visuospatial attention were possibly 
contaminated by confounding sensory differences be-
tween the conditions. In particular, stimulus intensity 
at the position of the masked prime was greater than 
stimulus intensity at other positions in the display, 
because masked primes as in the study of Neumann 
and Klotz (1994) and Ansorge and Neumann (2005) 
were used. Remember that this means that a pair of 
masked bars was presented at only one of several pos-
sible positions. Figure 2 illustrates procedures (using 
stimuli adapted from Klotz & Neumann, 1999) that 
should be used in the future to circumvent the con-
founding stimulus intensity differences in the study of 
top-down control contingencies of attentional masked 
priming effects.
Whereas it is relatively easy to compare attentional 
and response-activation effects of masked primes, 
the situation changes if it comes to the comparison 
of semantic and sensorimotor effects. The reason for 
this is that sensorimotor and attentional effects can be 
studied by using the same kind of stimuli. Thus, any 
confounding stimulus differences between the condi-
tions are prevented. By contrast, the same is not true 
for semantic and sensorimotor effects: It is hard to im-
agine, for example, what kind of response-activation 
effect would be an appropriate test of the association 
between the words “chair” and “table”.
However, the problem can be solved in the latter 
case too. In an ingenious study, Dimberg, Thunberg, 
and Elmehed (2000), for example, showed that masked 
face stimuli with different affective expressions led to 
corresponding face muscle activations on the side of 
the observer. This study nicely illustrates that with 
appropriate procedures the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis of masked semantic priming can be tested 
and confirmed.
Support for a unitary account of masked prim-
ing effects also comes from influences of temporal 
uncertainty reduction on masked semantic priming 
and masked sensorimotor priming effects. Kiefer and 
Brendel (2006) used a warning signal for an upcoming 
masked priming word, and found that masked seman-
tic priming was restricted to conditions with a rela-
tively short interval between the warning signal and 
masked prime. Along similar lines, accessory stimuli 
that are used as a warning signal have a modulating 
effect on the amount of sensorimotor priming exerted 
by a masked arrow prime (Fischer, Schubert, & Liepelt, 
2007).
Still, however, other findings, such as different time 
courses of masked semantic priming and masked re-
sponse priming effects, point in the direction of differ-
ences between the underlying responsible faculties of 
unconscious vision. So far, however, any conclusions 
must be tentative, because the comparison between 
masked semantic and masked sensorimotor priming 
suffers from confounding differences between the 
stimuli or their relevant features. Most importantly, 
Figure 2. 
Depicted is an invalid trial, with a masked shape-singleton 
prime in the upper left corner (the one red diamond among 
the three different, shape-homogenous square primes) in the 
first display (depicted in the background) followed by square-
shaped masks at all four positions (depicted in the fore-
ground), with one of the masking squares serving as a target. 
In the depicted example trial, participants have to search for 
a black target square (in the upper right corner of the depict-
ed display), and have to respond to its location (i.e., whether 
it is left or right). Thus, the trial is invalid because the masked 
singleton prime is presented at a position away from the tar-
get. Note that the masked shape-singleton prime is task-ir-
relevant in almost every respect. It has a color and a shape 
different from that of the target. Thus, participants have no 
reason to intentionally search for the shape or for the color of 
the shape-singleton prime. Furthermore, under the depicted 
conditions, participants have also no incentive to search for 
a singleton by intention, because the target is not a single-
ton either (neither with respect to its shape nor its color). 
Would the masked shape-singleton prime still capture atten-
tion away from the target? (Under the depicted conditions 
this prediction is made by theories assuming that attention 
is captured to locations containing the largest feature differ-
ences relative to the rest of the display.) The corresponding 
attentional effect would be reflected in posterior ERP laterality 
indices (compared to conditions with masked shape-singleton 
prime and target being presented on the same side, e.g., 
both being on the right). Note that under the depicted condi-
tions, stimulus intensity in the priming display is the same at 
all positions. Therefore, any index of attentional capture by 
the masked shape-singleton prime cannot be attributed to 
stimulus intensity. (Arrow: direction of time.)
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evidence for different time courses of masked semantic 
and masked response priming could be due to the use 
of mostly spatial and orientation information in masked 
sensorimotor priming studies, in contrast to the use of 
nonspatial meaning in masked semantic priming stud-
ies. With few exceptions (e.g., Klapp, 2005), studies of 
inverse masked priming used invisible location infor-
mation of one or another kind. 
Therefore, we suggest that masked semantic prim-
ing effects should be tested with words that have 
spatial meaning and thus bear a close resemblance to 
the typical features used in masked sensorimotor and 
attentional priming studies. For three related reasons, 
spatial meaning should be used for that purpose in 
future masked semantic priming studies. First, physi-
cal spatial information is responsible for many of the 
masked sensorimotor and attentional effects. The rea-
son is obvious. Spatial information is shared by sen-
sory and motor systems. It provides a common code 
across these domains, so to say (Prinz, 1990, 1997). 
Second and related, a large number of different effects 
have been detailed in masked sensorimotor prim-
ing studies by the use of masked spatial information. 
Examples are inversions of the priming effect, with 
better performance under incongruent than congruent 
conditions, once prime-target intervals exceed about 
100 ms (cf. Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998), or additive 
effects of spatial target-response correspondence/non-
correspondence and spatial prime-target correspond-
ence/noncorrespon-dence (Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). 
(Other examples were given above.) Third and finally, 
it was noted above that some evidence for an embod-
ied cognition view of semantic processing was found in 
investigations of spatial word meaning (e.g., Proctor & 
Vu, 2002).
Masked priming and theories of 
backward masking
The majority of theories of backward masking focus 
more or less solely on the perception of the masked 
test stimulus (e.g., Kahneman, 1968; Stigler, 1910; 
Weisstein, 1968; for reviews see Breitmeyer, 1984, 
this volume; Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006), although 
some of these theories already contained less clearly 
stated implications for mask perception too (e.g., 
Bridgeman, 1971, this volume). Breitmeyer (1984), 
for instance, attributed the diminished visibility of 
the metacontrast masked test stimulus to inhibition 
exerted by fast transient channel activity (carrying in-
formation about mask onset) on activity in sustained 
channels (carrying information about test stimulus 
color and shape). An explanation of (diminished) test 
stimulus perception is also central to some recent 
mathematical models of backward masking (e.g., 
Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2000; Francis, 1997; Francis 
& Herzog, 2004).
A second class of backward masking theories addi-
tionally seeks to explain aspects of (conscious) mask 
perception (Bachmann, 1984, 1994; Di Lollo, Enns, & 
Rensink, 2000; Hamker, this volume; Herzog, Ernst, 
Etzold, & Eurich, 2003; Neumann, 1982; Neumann 
& Scharlau, in press; Scharlau, 2002). Herzog et 
al. (2003), for example, explain how features of the 
masked test stimulus can contribute to the phenom-
enal appearance of the mask’s shape (e.g., Herzog & 
Koch, 2001; Otto, Öğmen, & Herzog, 2006; Werner, 
1935). Others (Bachmann, 1994; Neumann, 1982; 
Scharlau, 2002) gave accounts of temporal aspects 
of mask perception – that is, the decreased latency of 
perceiving a mask to a similar stimulus when it is not 
masking a preceding masked test stimulus.
A third class of models seeks to explain masked 
priming effects – that is, behavioral instead of percep-
tual effects (Vorberg et al., 2003). According to Vorberg 
and colleagues, the prime activates a response, and 
this activation accumulates for the duration that the 
masked prime is presented in isolation. Once the visible 
target commences, however, target-induced response 
activation kicks in that either adds to the already ac-
cumulated prime activity (because the visible target 
indicates the same response as the masked prime) or 
diminishes it (because the visible target indicates an 
alternative response). In both cases, a particular overt 
response will be executed, once a threshold of activ-
ity for that particular response has been passed. As 
a consequence, the execution of a particular response 
will occur fast after the onset of the visible target if 
masked prime and visible target activate one and the 
same response.
Finally, some theories account for both perceptual 
aspects of metacontrast masking and masked prim-
ing effects (Bowman, Schlaghecken, & Eimer, 2006; 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). According to Lamme 
and Roelfsema, for instance, masked priming effects 
could be due to visual information being passed to 
successive visual and association cortex areas (hence, 
being available for response activation) during the 
first 100 ms after stimulus onset, a phase called the 
feedforward sweep by the authors. Conscious per-
ception of a visual stimulus, however, would occur 
only during the following recurrent processing phase, 
during which initial stimulus-induced activity is con-
firmed by feedback activity from more anterior areas 
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reaching back to the early visual cortical areas. As a 
consequence of this general architecture, a masked 
prime can activate a response (and is processed in 
some extent), despite the fact that a mask prevents 
visibility of the same prime stimulus because the 
mask prevents the confirmation of the feedforward 
signal triggered by the prime stimulus during the 
reentrant phase. 
Bowman, Schlaghecken, and Eimer (2006), argue 
that reduced visibility of the masked prime stimulus 
is created by feedforward-driven competition between 
different possible perceptual states, and that inverted 
response priming effects are due to another mecha-
nism, recurrent lateral inhibition between alternative 
response nodes.
Despite the diversity of these different approaches 
to explain backward masking and/or masked priming, 
all of the reviewed theories and models share the fun-
damental assumption that masked priming effects are 
inconsequential for what can be visually perceived in 
masking situations. Yet there are two good reasons to 
consider this possibility. First, according to the sen-
sorimotor supremacy hypothesis, overt motor behav-
ior provides building blocks for conscious perception 
(cf. Gurwitsch, 1964; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Strauss, 
1963). Thus, different latencies of sensorimotor proc-
esses could impact latencies of conscious perception. 
To our knowledge, there is so far only one model 
that acknowledges this possibility and has been sug-
gested to apply to masked priming effects: According 
to the MMC (Mean of Multiple Computation) model, 
sensorimotor priming effects are due to independent 
feedforward inputs by (a) the masked prime and (b) 
the visible target, whereas conscious perception of the 
visible target corresponds to a stable attractor state of 
the artificial neural net that is only achieved after sev-
eral iterations of forward and backward propagated 
activity (Cruse, 2003). It should be noted that the 
model was originally developed to give an account of 
pointing directions. At present, it admittedly awaits its 
detailed application to the results of masked priming 
studies. 
Crucially in the current context, however, the MMC 
model predicts that the neural net achieves its sta-
ble attractor state faster under conditions in which 
masked prime and visible target activate similar 
responses than under conditions in which masked 
prime and visible target activate alternative respons-
es, respectively. So far, this prediction of the MMC 
model seems not to be supported by the evidence. 
Scharlau and Ansorge (2003), for instance, found 
similar amounts of perceptual latency facilitation un-
der both the aforementioned conditions. Yet, under 
all of these conditions, masked primes also allowed 
for attentional facilitation. Therefore, attentional fa-
cilitation as a common effect of both response-con-
gruent and response-incongruent primes could have 
occurred instead of a perceptual latency inhibition by 
the sensorimotor effects of the incongruent masked 
primes (relative to the congruent primes) in studies 
such as that of Scharlau and Ansorge. Future studies 
should prevent attentional facilitation by the masked 
prime from occuring instead of sensorimotor process-
ing of the masked primes, for example, by present-
ing all stimuli at already attended-to locations, so 
that common attentional effects of the primes are 
undermined.
A second implication of masked priming research 
for backward masking theories is that goal settings 
impact on sensorimotor processing of masked visual 
stimuli (cf. Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Kunde et al., 
2003) in general and the distribution of attention to 
masked stimuli in particular (Ansorge & Neumann, 
2005; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003). The likely reason 
for this is that the extent of a match between a goal 
setting and a feature of a masked stimulus changes the 
visual processing dynamics: There is evidence from 
research with visible stimuli that a goal setting (or 
working memory content) can determine both (a) the 
latency with which attention can be directed to a par-
ticular visual feature (cf. Ansorge & Horstmann, 2007; 
Ansorge, Horstmann, & Carbone, 2005; Soto, Heinke, 
Humphreys, & Blanco, 2005) and (b) the duration with 
which attention is kept on a particular visual stimulus 
(Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 
2000). With a visible stimulus that matches the goal 
settings (say a red stimulus if observers search for 
something red), the latency with which attention can 
be directed to that stimulus is curtailed and the du-
ration with which attention is kept on that stimulus 
is prolonged. Moreover, at least the latter seems to 
hold true for unconscious visual stimuli too (Ivanoff & 
Klein, 2003).
Now because (a) goal settings determine where hu-
mans direct their attention and (b) the direction and 
distribution of attention to a stimulus is necessary for 
conscious visual perception of the same stimulus and 
thus precedes it (cf. Neisser, 1967; Treisman & Gelade, 
1980), we should expect collateral effects of goal set-
tings set up for sensorimotor processing purposes on 
the latency of conscious visual stimulus perception too, 
in line with the observation that the extent of a match 
between a goal setting and a masked visual stimulus 
directly impacts on the latency of conscious mask per-
Sensorimotor supremacy
269
http://www.ac-psych.org
ception (Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003). There are several 
models and theories of visual attention that could in 
principle be applied to detail the corresponding influ-
ences in backward masking and masked priming theo-
ries (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Hamker, 2004; 
VanRullen & Thorpe, 1999). However, again, these are 
conceivable applications of the models which have to 
await future research.
Summary
The current report showed that the sensorimotor 
supremacy hypothesis is both well supported by a 
large body of evidence and rich in new predictions 
for future research. In the first part of our report, 
we reviewed different kinds of masked priming ef-
fects, sensorimotor, attentional, and semantic prim-
ing. We argued that masked sensorimotor priming is 
very good evidence for the sensorimotor supremacy 
hypothesis: According to this hypothesis, conscious 
perception draws on motor behavior, and thus fol-
lows sensorimotor processing, and therefore can be 
disrupted at a point in time by a backward mask at 
which response-activation effects already escaped 
the influence of the mask. We also suggested that 
masked attentional and semantic priming effects 
could reflect variants of sensorimotor priming – that 
is, premotor specification of motor parameters and 
partial re-instantiations of prior sensorimotor proc-
esses in memory, respectively. Finally, we ended the 
first part of our report by suggesting ways to test 
the sensorimotor account of masked attentional and 
masked semantic priming effects.
In the second part of our report, we reviewed 
different theories and models of backward mask-
ing and masked priming effects, and concluded that 
these do not fully acknowledge possible bearings 
that masked priming effects have on any theory of 
backward masking. We proceeded by detailing two 
of these bearings from masked priming research, 
impacts that (a) sensorimotor processes and (b) 
goal settings can have on what is perceived and 
at what time under backward masking conditions. 
Finally, we summarized some of the existing motor 
and attention theories and models which could be 
used in future research to account for the so far 
unacknowledged bearings of masked priming effects 
on backward masking.
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